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Towards a Deposit Guarantee
Insurance in China? A Law and
Economics Perspective
Michael Faure* and Jiye Huy
Abstract
Deposit guarantee insurance has been a very debated topic both in the USA and in
Europe. Deposit guarantee insurance is considered to be a highly important mechanism
to prevent bank runs and to restore depositor confidence, which is why both in the USA
and in Europe during the financial crisis measures were taken to increase the coverage
amounts. Interestingly, China is also considering the introduction of a deposit guarantee
system. China has indeed known many cases of bank failures recently. Until approxi-
mately 20 years ago, this may not have been a big problem in China for the simple
reason that all banks were state owned and an implicit guarantee system was provided
via the state. However, with privatization of financial markets also occurring in China,
bank runs and resulting bank failures have also begun to occur in this country.
Attempts have been taken to introduce a deposit guarantee scheme, but they were put on
hold because of the financial crisis. This article looks at the particular situation of
China, not only addressing some of the instances of bank failures but also studying the
particular design problems that may arise in the Chinese context, in the light of experi-
ences in the USA and Europe. Indeed, from the US and European experience, it is well
known that, on the one hand, deposit insurance may have many beneficial aspects
(preventing bank runs), but, on the other hand, it may also create problems of its own
(in particular, creating a moral hazard on the side of financial institutions and neglect
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on the side of depositors). The article examines how these problems may play out in China
and also argues that given the fact that the big five Chinese banks are still state owned
introducing risk dependent contributions (which is now advocated in the USA and
Europe) may not be appropriate in China.
Keywords: deposit guarantee insurance; financial stability; insurance premium
rates; legislation; bailouts; economic analysis; risk differentiation
Introduction
In the past 33 years, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has doubled every
seven years.1 After surpassing Italy in 2005, China’s economy did not stop this
incredible pace: in 2006, its GDP surpassed the United Kingdom; in 2007, it
surpassed Germany and, in 2010, Japan. As a result, China has now become
the second largest economy in the world. The financial sector has played an
important role in China’s economic success story. However, until now, China
is one of the few countries that does not have an explicit deposit insurance
scheme. How to establish such an explicit deposit insurance scheme has
become an important topic for both government officials and scholars in
China.
Indeed, a major source of worry for many financial institutions and poten-
tially a source of financial crisis is the tendency of consumers to withdraw
their savings from a financial institution, often based on rumours concerning
the financial situation of a particular bank. A run on the bank occurs when
customers/institutions panic and worry that their bank will go bankrupt,
losing the funds they have deposited. In such a situation, many customers
will withdraw their savings, all within a very narrow time frame (that is, a
few days). Although at the beginning, the bank may not have been insolvent,
a run on the bank can precipitate the bank into bankruptcy. Indeed, as the
run on the bank propagates with more and more customers/institutions
losing confidence, at some point the bank’s reserve will not be able to meet all
of the withdrawal requests and, therefore, the bank will become insolvent.
During the Great Depression, a national run on the bank was characterized
by customers physically lining up at their bank to withdraw their savings.
With the availability of online transactions, a run on the bank can start with
customers/institutions transferring funds to other banks or financial institu-
tions they believe are less likely to default. These kinds of rumours may not
even be correct, but spreading these rumours can have a strong self-fulfilling
1 On the causes of China’s economic growth, see also Thomas S Ulen, ‘The Uneasy Case for
Competition Law and Regulation as Decisive Factors in Development: Some Lessons for China’
in Michael G Faure and Xinzhu Zhang (eds), Competition Policy and Regulation: Recent
Developments in China, the US and Europe (Edward Elgar 2011) 13^44, Thomas S Ulen, ‘The
Role of Law in Economic Growth and Development’ in Michael G Faure and Jan M Smits (eds),
Does Law Matter? On Law and Economic Growth (Intersentia 2011) 179^220.








aastricht user on 06 Septem
ber 2021
effect as a result of which a so-called bank run can take placeçthat is, clients
withdrawing all of their savings from a particular financial institution, inevit-
ably leading to its bankruptcy. These kinds of phenomena make the rumours
come true, and increasing numbers of people believe that almost all bank run
rumours will be realized. In this case, a run on the bank can only be mitigated
by certain government actions (that is, the increase of deposit insurance
limits by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the re-regulation
of banks, increased reserve requirements, monetary bailout, and so on).
One of the systems to prevent a bank run is a deposit guarantee scheme,
which is also referred to as deposit insurance. Deposit insurance, the legal
system addressing the issue of banking system stability, has become popular
around the world and is now common practice. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
many countries and regions began to establish a national system of deposit in-
surance law as an infrastructure to strengthen financial sectors and to build
a safety net for banks. A bank safety net could be defined as a set of policy
and legal measures that have as their goal the prevention of widespread bank
‘disintermediation’ and the loss of bank capital. The bank safety net is of
course also meant to be a part of a series of policies in law that include the fol-
lowing: (i) the role of the central bank as lender of last resort; (ii) the prudential
supervision of banks; and (iii) the deposit guarantee scheme. As a financial
safety net, the legal system of deposit insurance is an important part in main-
taining the stability of the financial system and protecting the interests of
depositors.
It is more particularly in the light of financial crises that policy makers have
considered it important to give a strong signal to the market, and in particular
to individual depositors, that individual savings are guaranteed up to a specific
amount in case the bank goes bankrupt. Hence, this so-called deposit guaran-
tee insurance has as its major goal the prevention of bank runs, and thus it
contributes to the financial stability of the financial market. Such a deposit
guarantee system was, inter alia, introduced in many European countries fol-
lowing the collapse of the Bank for Credit and Commerce International. As a
result, the European Union (EU) introduced a deposit guarantee scheme
through Council Directive (EC) 94/19 on deposit-guarantee schemes, which
was amended in 2009.2
Notwithstanding the undoubtedly positive effects of such a deposit guaran-
tee system, there has also been serious criticism of this system from econo-
mists. Some argue that a deposit guarantee system can give financial
institutions an incentive to pursue more risky investments. This tendency
may in turn lead to a negative impact on their solvency, thus aggravating the
problem. This moral hazard problem could be prevented if risk dependent pre-
miums were charged (meaning that financial institutions choosing more
risky investment strategies would pay higher contributions to the deposit guar-
antee system). However, in Europe, only eight countries apply a risk-based
2 Council Directive (EC) 94/19 on deposit-guarantee schemes [1994] OJ L135.
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contribution to their deposit guarantee fund, and the differences range only
from a minimum contribution of 75 per cent to a maximum of 140 per cent of
the standard amount.3 Many countries simply charge a contribution that is
only related to the size of the financial institution and not to its investment be-
haviour. This system may disadvantage larger financial institutions that avoid
risky investments and, thus in fact, cross-subsidize newcomers on the market
who attract depositors with high interest rates but are a risky investment.
Some commentators have therefore wondered whether the cure (of the deposit
guarantee system) is perhaps not worse than the disease (risk of bank runs)
since the system itself may encourage risky investment and thus contribute to
financial crises.4 Of course, proposals have been formulated to improve the
systemçfor example, by introducing risk-based contributions or by lowering
the coverage level.5
China has also been contemplating the introduction of a deposit guarantee
system, but so far, it has not yet been implemented for a variety of reasons.
The first reason is the earlier-mentioned problem that a guarantee system can
provide financial institutions with incentives for risky investments, thus lead-
ing to moral hazard. The second reason involves the question of how contribu-
tions to the guarantee scheme could be appropriately differentiated, again in
order to avoid moral hazard and cross-subsidization. The third reason is the
challenge posed by the enormous state-owned banksçthey have no incentives
to pay an insurance premium since they enjoy a free, substantial implicit guar-
antee from the central government. Still, the introduction of a deposit guaran-
tee system can be highly important for China in order to guarantee consumer
confidence in the growing Chinese economy. Hence, we will argue that the at-
tempts to introduce such a guarantee system in China should certainly be
encouraged since otherwise the risks of a bank run (in case of negative ru-
mours concerning a financial institution) are quite realistic.
The goal of this article is to analyse the feasibility of a deposit guarantee in-
surance system in China.We will do so by analysing some of the reasons why
such a system has failed so far in China.We will do so in the light of the experi-
ence in Europe, pointing at possible strengths and weaknesses in the current
European regulation as a learning tool for China. Our analysis will use a law
and economics framework, which will enable us to explain how a deposit guar-
antee system and its particular institutional structure can provide adequate in-
centives to all of the stakeholders involved.
Given this goal, the article is set up in the following way. After the introduc-
tion, it will first provide a brief overview of the literature. Then it will critically
3 European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Econometrics and Applied Statistics Unit,
Possible Models for Risk-Based Contributions to EU Deposit Guarantee Schemes (2009),5http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm4accessed 8 May 2013.
4 Hans Groeneveld, ‘Towards a Balanced Deposit Guarantee System in Europe’ (2009) 419
Banking & Finance Rev 420.
5 Robert J Dijkstra and Michael G Faure, ‘Compensating Victims of Bankrupted Financial
Institutions: A Law and Economics Analysis’ (2011) 156 J Financial Reg & Compliance 157.
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review the various attempts to introduce a deposit guarantee system in China,
and it will consider the various sources of its failure. Next, the article will de-
scribe the deposit guarantee system as it exists in the EU and focus on the func-
tioning of the system in one particular Member State, the Netherlands. Then,
it will turn to an economic analysis explaining the potential dangers of a de-
posit guarantee system, the way in which it affects the incentives of stake-
holders, and the remedies that should be introduced to deal with the moral
hazards that may result from such an insurance system. These economic ob-
servations will be used to formulate a few policy recommendations on the
way in which a deposit guarantee system could be successfully introduced in
China. The final section provides a conclusion.
A brief literature review
Economists have given various explanations for the phenomenon of the bank
run. Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig’s 1983 model shows that depositors
face privately observed risks that lead to a demand for liquidity.6 A depositor’s
bank run is purely based on some external factors that can be irrelevant for
the financial performance of the bank. Just like the effect of a butterfly that
can supposedly cause a hurricane, a crisis that originally involves only a
single area and a single financial product can become like a hurricane as
well, covering the global financial market. The authors have proposed that the
government should adopt a ‘lender of last resort’ system in which the govern-
ment provides timely emergency loans to banks and, at the same time, estab-
lishes a deposit insurance scheme to prevent bank runs from occurring due to
asymmetric information. Diamond and Dybvig therefore argue that bank
runs can be prevented when deposits are fully and credibly insured.7
V.V. Chari and Ravi Jagannathan give another explanation, emphasizing that
bank runs may be a reasonable response of depositors when they have
observed long ‘lines’at the gates of a bankçthey correctly infer from the lines
that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and hence precipitate a
bank run. Due to poor performance-related information, depositors panic, trig-
gering a massive run. Extra market constraints such as the suspension of con-
vertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations.8
As Robert Merton has shown, deposit insurance can be viewed as a put
option on the value of a bank’s assets at a strike price equal to the promised ma-
turity value of its debt.9 Robert Cull, Lemma Senbet, and Marco Sorge have
6 DouglasW Diamond and Philip H Dybvig, ‘Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity’ (1983)
91 J Political Economy 401.
7 Ibid 401^19.
8 VV Chari and Ravi Jagannathan, ‘Banking Panics, Information and Rational Expectation
Equilibrium’ (1988) 43 J Finance 749.
9 Robert C Merton, ‘An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance Loan Guarantees’
(1977) 1 J Banking & Finance 3.
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compared empirical datasets in dozens of countries provided by the World
Bank and found that deposit insurance schemes are primarily intended to
reduce the risk of systemic failure of banks and hence to stabilize the payments
and financial system.10 The likelihood that a formal deposit insurance scheme
could protect the financial sector is deemed to be significantly higher than
what the implicit deposit insurance system could do. An implicit deposit guar-
antee system is the system whereby a government bails out (larger) financial
institutions whenever they get into trouble. This outlook explains the increase
in the number of countries offering explicit deposit guarantees from only 20
in 1980 to 87 by the end of 2003.11 In the USA where the deposit insurance
scheme was first introduced in the world, James Barth found the
International Federation of Consulting Engineers had been given adequate
powers, and was required to make full and effective use of them, in order to
guarantee that an incipient unhealthy condition may be immediately corrected
and that inefficient banks may be closed before they reach a state where liquid-
ation would involve losses.12
Although the deposit insurance schemes have obviously solved some of the
banks’ liquidity problems as well as improved the anti-risk ability, the moral
hazard resulting from the scheme has greatly limited its effectiveness. Michael
Keeley tested the hypothesis that increases in competition cause bank charter
values to decline, which in turn causes banks to increase the default risk
through increases in asset risk and reductions in capital.13 Another problem
of the deposit insurance system is that its scope of protection for depositors is
too broad. This issue raises the question whether the benefits of this new
legal initiative for the country’s financial environment are to some extent
offset by neglect from the depositors. If the deposit insurance scheme would
indeed lead to such an effect, the newly established legal system would just be
a transplant in that case, borrowed from another legal system, but would in
fact show many defects. Especially in times of financial crisis, there is a
danger that deposit insurance would be blamed as being one of the causes of
the financial crisis and thus become a ‘scapegoat’. From this perspective, de-
posit insurance would be undesirable since it would lead to risky behaviour
by financial institutions. Some countries have even held that abolishing de-
posit insurance may be the most adequate solution. For example, in 1992,
Argentina abolished the system of deposit insurance. However, a financial
10 Robert Cull, LemmaW Senbet, and Marco Sorge, ‘The Effect of Deposit Insurance on Financial
Debt: A Cross-CountryAnalysis’ (2002) 42 Q Rev Econ & Finance 673.
11 Asli Demirgu« -Kunt, Edward J Kane, and Luc A Laeven, ‘Deposit Insurance Design and
Implementation: Policy Lessons from Research and Practice’ (2006) World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper Series no 3969,5http://ssrn.com/abstract¼9232764 accessed 8 May
2013.
12 James R Barth,‘Deposit Insurance Reform’ in United States Senate, Deposit Insurance Reform and
Financial Modernization, Hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
(US Government Printing Office 1990) volume 2, 58^67.
13 Michael C Keeley, ‘Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking’ (1990) 80 Am Econ
Rev 1183.








aastricht user on 06 Septem
ber 2021
crisis that later took place in Mexico forced Argentina to reintroduce deposit
insurance in 1995.14
Another important default of deposit insurance schemes is the concomitant
issue of moral hazard. G.G. Kaufman argues that deposit insurance schemes
will create moral hazard, and he proposes to implement measures to limit the
protection of deposits to depositors of banks and financial institutions in
order to create incentives to monitor operational risks.15 Eugene White even
holds that deposit insurance presents ‘enormous incentive problems’ and
would hence also be inappropriate for developing and transition economies.16
Therefore, some economists shift the attention to the effectiveness in liquidity
problems and financial stability. They suggest strategies such as interbank
lending and co-insurance. The key element of these proposals is that when a
bank faces a shortage of liquidity it can borrow money through the interbank
system or through short-term funds by the central bank, which is the lender
of last resort. For example, when a particular impact on the liquidity of banks
by other banks may not be strong, other private banks could conclude agree-
ments with the industry. This is a so-called co-insurance approach that could
solve the problem that Sudipto Bhattacharya and Douglas Gale uncover,
namely that a surplus liquidity on the banking market could in fact lead to illi-
quid banks.17
As a result of the risk prevention capabilities in the interbank market, a
shortage of bank liquidity will limit the access to credit within the banking in-
dustry, unless the bank can prove that it has a lower risk of default. However,
it may be hard for the bank itself to disclose its asset quality characteristics.
With the capital markets having been developed, the development of informa-
tion technology and innovative financial contracts greatly facilitate borrowers’
access to capital markets. This access reduces the pre-and post-information
asymmetry.When a bank faces a liquidity shock, the bank can more easily li-
quidate a lower loss, to ease temporary liquidity needs, thus reducing the real
value of deposit insurance. Anthony Santomero also holds that depository
institutions play a crucial role in an economy by serving as a repository for
savings, supporting private sector expenditures, and providing positive returns
to liability holders.18 However, Santomero argues that deposit insurance
also has its own set of problems, being that it encourages risk taking by
insured institutions and neglect by depositors. Hence, these potential problems
need to be carefully addressed as well.
14 Geoffrey P Miller,‘Is Deposit Insurance Inevitable? Lessons from Argentina’ (1996) 16 Int’l Rev L
& Econ 211.
15 GG Kaufman, ‘Bank Failures, Systematic Risk and Bank Regulations’ (1996) 16 Cato Journal 17.
16 Eugene M White, ‘Deposit Insurance’ (1995) World Bank Policy ResearchWorking Paper Series
no 1541,5http://ssrn.com/abstract¼5692054accessed 8 May 2013.
17 Sudipto Bhattacharya and Douglas Gale,‘Preference Shocks, Liquidity and Central Bank Policy’
in WA Barnett and K Singleton (eds), New Approaches to Monetary Economics (Cambridge
University Press 1987) 69^88.
18 Anthony M Santomero,‘Deposit Insurance: DoWe Need It andWhy?’ (1997) Wharton Financial
Institutions Centre 97,5http://ssrn.com/abstract¼339604accessed 8 May 2013.
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In addition, more recent legal literature has critically reviewed the deposit
guarantee system, inter alia, in the way in which it has been implemented in
the EU. For example, the senior vice-president of Rabobank Nederland has
held that the deposit guarantee system in Europe provides substantially per-
verse effects. The reason is, so he holds, that it stimulates risky behaviour of de-
positors and financial institutions and would thus rather undermine financial
stability instead of stimulating it.19 Moreover, authors in corporate law hold
that the deposit guarantee system provides a wrong signal to consumers by sig-
nalling that as long as the consumer purchases a financial product on which
the deposit guarantee system is applicable there is no risk whatsoever that the
customer would lose his money.20 S. Schich also holds that knowing the exist-
ence of the deposit guarantee system and its effect on the insured institutions
and depositors, financial regulators are thus forced to take a more active role
to remedy the potentially perverse effects of the deposit guarantee system.21
Deposit guarantee insurance in China: a story of failed
attempts
The steps to developing a deposit guarantee system in China
Implicit guarantees via bailouts by government
For a long period in China, an implicit deposit insurance scheme has existed
based on government credit guarantees provided by China’s Central Bank, the
People’s Bank of China (PBC). When local banks or financial institutions in
China become financially distressed or even enter bankruptcy, a joint task
force team is usually created to deal with the bank’s failure, since the local gov-
ernments have the responsibility to maintain social stability and banks are
constituted by the Central Bank, the local government, and other relevant
stakeholders. The task force team (which is mainly made up of members of
the Central Bank) will pay the individual debt, which means that the govern-
ment in fact provides an implicit deposit insurance scheme.
A good example of the problems that arise in the case of an absence of an ex-
plicit deposit guarantee system (as is currently the case in China) is provided
by the take over of the Hainan Development Bank (HDB). After the Spring
Festival of 1998 in the southern China island province of Hainan, a rumour
started that HDB would be in financial difficulty. It was a local bank that had
been in existence for a mere three years and that was well known for attract-
ing depositors with high interest rates. However, the real estate bubble burst
19 Groeneveld (n 4).
20 HM Vletter-Van Dort, ‘Ice Save: ‘‘If Something Seems too be Good to Be True, It Probably Is’’’
(2009) Ars Aequi 810.
21 S Schich, ‘Financial Turbulence: Some Lessons Regarding Deposit Insurance’ (2008) 69 OECD
Financial Market Trends 55.
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in Hainan in the 1990s and this crisis made it difficult for HDB to recover some
of its loans, which were based on security provided by real estate. Local gov-
ernment officials hastened to deny the rumour. Nevertheless, a large number
of depositors started to remove both their deposits and their interest from
HDB, moving both to China’s top five state-owned banks (Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China [ICBC], China Construction Bank, Bank of China,
Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of Communications), even though they
offered lower interest rates than HDB.
Subsequently, HDB introduced a limit on the weekly amounts that depositors
could withdraw and gave priority to ensuring the repayment of individual de-
positors. The PBC raised an emergency aid of RMB 3.15 billion to rescue HDB.
At the same time, it allowed HDB to issue a bond of RMB 0.9 billion in
February 1998 and of 0.5 billion in April 1998, but all of the rescue attempts
could not save HDB. On 21 June 1998, the PBC announced the closure of HDB
and declared that from the date of closure, all assets and liabilities of HDB
would be handled by ICBC.22 Since ICBC is the largest state-owned commercial
bank in China, the announcement by the PBC provided confidence to depos-
itors as a result of which depositors simply transferred their savings to ICBC
without causing much social unrest.
The case of Weihai Urban Cooperative Bank (WUCB) is another example.
WUCB was established in June 1997. It was formed by five local urban credit
cooperatives that had poor management and a lack of effective supervisory
mechanisms. After WUCB had been set up and started its activities, a variety
of potential risks began to materializeça substantial decline in the deposits
took place and some sub-branches were unable to pay the debts due in March
1998. The triggering wave of large-scale runs began: withdrawing depositors
crowded outside the banks, culminating in up to 200 visitors per day in one
branch. TheWeihai municipal government was forced to take urgent stringent
measures and to mobilize the police to the outlets of the banks to maintain
public order. The PBC also conducted on-site monitoring. The local government
replaced non-performing assets of RMB 800 million with fiscal revenues and
sold 58 per cent of the shares of WUCB to a local state-owned enterprise.
Finally, the PBC and the local government spent a total amount of RMB 1.8 bil-
lion to save the bank, they changed its name to the Weihai City Commercial
Bank in October 1998.23
From 1997 to 1998, the PBC closed 42 problematic depository institutions:
one commercial bank (that is, the earlier-mentioned HDB), 23 urban credit
cooperatives, and 18 rural credit cooperatives. In addition, the PBC closed
three trust and investment companies (China Agricultural Trust and Invest-
ment Corporation, China Venture Investment Corporation, and Guangdong
22 Hua Liu, ‘Enlightenment of Hainan Development Bank’s Close Down’ (2004) 2 The Banker 123
[in Chinese].
23 Mingli Wu and others, ‘The Dynamic Improvement of Government Behaviour and Regulation:
A Case Study of Banking Risk Resolution inWeihai City Commercial Bank’ (2003) 3 J Finance
105 [in Chinese].
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International Trust and Investment Corporation [GITIC]). The par value of
assets of all of the closed financial institutions totalled RMB 108.8 billion.24 Of
these cases, the GITIC case was probably the most important one. In October
1998, GITIC incurred heavy losses and could not meet its maturing debts. The
central bank announced the closure of this financial institution. However, the
liquidation, which was led by a well-known international accounting firm,
found that GITIC was seriously insolvent. In January 1999, GITIC applied for
bankruptcy.25 This was the first time a financial institution had gone bankrupt
in China.
Becoming increasingly expensive and debated
Bank runs on small credit cooperatives occur more frequently at the provincial
and city level. For example, in Shantou city of Guangdong province, 13 local
urban credit cooperatives agreed to merge with the approval of the PBC to
establish the Shantou City Commercial Bank (SCCB) in 1997. They solicited de-
positors and attracted them with high interest rates. However, a misappropri-
ation of funds took place as well as off-the-book loans and a series of
operational problems. The result was that SCCB could not pay the debt of ap-
proximately RMB 1.5 billion to its depositors, which included the Shantou City
Finance Bureau and other departments of the local government. The loan loss
rate climbed as high as 32.23 per cent. After effectively operating for only four
years, the SCCB was closed down by the PBC in August 2001.26
In Zhejiang province, after depositors realized that the chairman of the
Huangyan Xunda Urban Credit Cooperative (ZXUCC) had speculated with
RMB 60 million of credit capital, they rushed to the credit cooperative to with-
draw their money. The provincial government created an emergency fund of
RMB 45 million, and the PBC also injected a deposit reserve into the credit co-
operative. In the end, most of the individual depositors’ savings and interests
were paid back, while only the deposits of some non-individual customers
went unpaid. These events led to a heated debate in financial circles.27 The
result of this debate was the unanimous conclusion that especially in order to
deal with risks posed by small- and medium-sized financial institutions it was
24 Shiyu Liu, ‘China’s Experience in Small and Medium Financial Institution Resolution’ (1999)
Bank for International Settlements,5https://www.bis.org/publ/plcy07t.pdf4 accessed 8 May
2013.
25 For an analysis of the cases, see the report by Xie Ping who was at the time the head of the re-
search department of the People’s Bank of China. Xie Ping, ‘Bank Restructuring in China’
(1999) Bank for International Settlements,5http://www.bis.org/publ/plcy06c.pdf4accessed 8
May 2013.
26 Guotai Chi and others, ‘Warning Model of Operating Risk for Commercial Banks and Its
Empirical Study’ (2009) 24 J Systems Engineering 408 [in Chinese].
27 Guohua Ying, ‘Moth of Huangyan Xunda Urban Credit Cooperative’ (2003) 2 China
Anti-Counterfeiting 26 [in Chinese].
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urgently necessary to create a deposit insurance scheme. The idea was that a
deposit insurance scheme could remove the worry from depositors concerning
the potential loss of their savings. Thus, deposit insurance could limit damage
due to bank runs, reduce the adverse social impacts of bankruptcy of financial
institutions, and maintain the stability of the financial system.
From the cases of HDB,WUCB, and ZXUCC, we can see that implicit deposit
government guarantees have played an important role in maintaining social
stability and protecting the individual depositors’ interest. However, the disad-
vantages of the current system also become increasingly clear. First, the gov-
ernment has absorbed a heavy cost in paying for the losses of these banks
and financial institutions. These losses will inevitably be passed on to the tax-
payers, while only the depositors of the institution that is bailed out will gain
any benefit. This kind of implicit deposit insurance scheme, thus, creates a
negative redistribution to the disadvantage of ordinary taxpayers. Second, as
the lender of last resort, the central bank has the implicit duty to deal with
the consequences of the financial crisis, but commercial banks, which have
no responsibility in this matter, can receive high earnings from the risky in-
vestments in which they engage. Such a situation creates the moral hazard to
which we referred in the introduction. Third, the current implicit deposit insur-
ance scheme prioritizes individual depositorsçnon-individual depositors will
suffer a loss in the case that the financial institution closes and they will
hence suffer in the case that the commercial banks fail.
The initial steps
Policy makers in China have also realized many disadvantages in the current
implicit deposit guarantee system based on government guarantees. Thus, the
idea rose to create explicit deposit insurance. The first governmental document
can be traced back to 1993. The State Council’s Decision on the Reform of the
Financial System (State Council Documentary No. 91, 1993) proposed to estab-
lish a national deposit insurance fund, and it was the first formal announce-
ment of the idea to construct an explicit deposit insurance scheme in China.
In 1997, the national financial conference made the announcement of build-
ing a national deposit insurance scheme for small- and medium-sized financial
institutions. In the same year, the PBC set up a special task force team to
undertake research concerning the necessary framework for an explicit de-
posit insurance scheme in China. After several years of study, the task force
team published a report entitled Some Thinking on Building up a Deposit
Insurance Scheme in China in 2003. The report pointed out that six issues had
to be solved when introducing an explicit deposit insurance scheme: (i) evalu-
ating the timing and steps to take to change from an implicit to an explicit de-
posit insurance scheme; (ii) establishing the organizational framework for a
deposit insurance scheme; (iii) dealing with the moral hazards that may
result from a deposit insurance scheme; (iv) determining the reasonable scope
and limits of the awarded protection; (v) collecting and building up a deposit
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insurance fund; and (vi) developing a market exit mechanism for failed com-
mercial banks.28
In April 2004, the Deposit Insurance Section was set up under the
Department of Financial Stability in the PBC. The new governmental office
did some preparatory work to promote the establishment of an explicit deposit
insurance scheme by drafting the legislation necessary for such a scheme. In
December 2004, a draft of the Deposit Insurance Regulation was presented to
the relevant ministerial departments. Government officials, scholars, and legis-
lators were working together to prepare a draft law for China’s deposit insur-
ance. In March 2005, the State Council principally approved the initial
proposal to establish a deposit insurance scheme, prepared by the Department
of Financial Stability of the PBC. By the end of 2006, the PBC published its
second China Financial Stability Report, in which the PBC pointed out that it
would speed up the development of a deposit insurance scheme and promote
a sound long-term risk management mechanism.29 The report deals with the
roles of deposit insurance agencies, membership in the deposit insurance
scheme, the source of the deposit insurance fund, the maximum payment
limits, the institutional arrangements, and other issues.
On 2 August 2007, the chairman of the US FDIC, Sheila Bair, met Zhou
Xiaochuan, governor of the PBC. It was mentioned that with the commercial
banks reform progressing smoothly, the financial industry continuing to open
up, and the stable macro-economic situation, the implementation of a deposit
insurance system could be implemented at a low cost. The relevant state depart-
ments began to undertake legislative work concerning the Deposit Insurance
Act.30 In March 2008, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced in his report to
the National People’s Congress that China would establish a deposit insurance
scheme in the near future.31 However, because of the international financial
crises in the same year, the establishment of the deposit insurance scheme
was delayed. Finally, in August 2009, the PBC, in combination with the China
Banking Regulatory Committee and other concerned organizations, submitted
a new implementation deposit insurance proposal to the State Council, China’s
central government. In its most recent 2011 China Financial Stability Report,
the PBC published its point of view concerning the deposit insurance scheme:
Currently, due to the absence of a deposit insurance scheme in China, there is a moral
hazard that is related to a reliance on the creditworthiness of government. Facing the
increasingly complex international and domestic financial situation, a fully and effectively
28 Task Force Team of People’s Bank of China, ‘SomeThinking on Building up a Deposit Insurance
System in China’ (2003) 5 China Finance 17 [in Chinese].
29 People’s Bank of China (PBC), China Financial Stability Report 2006 (China Financial Publishing
House (2006)5http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/959/1958/19584/19584_.html4accessed
8 May 2013.
30 Yan Song and Juanjuan Niu, ‘Zhou Xiaochuan: It Is Ripe for Establishing a Deposit Insurance
System’ Chinese Financial News (Beijing, 3 August 2007) [in Chinese].
31 JiabaoWen, Report on theWork of the Government (First Session of the Eleventh National People’s
Congress, Beijing, 5 March 2008), 5http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Special_11_3/2010-03/
03/content_1547655.htm4accessed 8 May 2013.
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functioning deposit insurance scheme with appropriate powers and responsibilities should
be established in a timely manner in order to exert a positive impact on protecting depositor
interests, safeguarding public confidence and stability and improving a market-based exit
mechanism for financial institutions.32
From this brief historical overview, it appears that China has had an implicit
deposit guarantee system for a long time, which has its historical roots in the
large role played by the PBC. However, the costs of this implicit deposit guaran-
tee system appear to be quite significant. At the same time, this system has
also created various potential risks, particularly in regard to moral hazards
and negative redistribution. In considering various incidents, discussed earlier,
these shortcomings become increasingly clear. The 2007 financial crisis,
which spread from the USA to a global financial crisis once more underscored
the importance of having an explicit deposit insurance scheme in order to
maintain the stability of the financial system. In 2012, Prime Minister Wen
Jiabao reiterated the intention of the Chinese government to set up a sound
mechanism for preventing systemic financial risks and for coordinating finan-
cial oversight and supervision to strengthen China’s ability to withstand
risks.33
The goals of a deposit insurance scheme in China
The brief historical overview in the previous section shows that after 20 years
of discussion and preparation, there is now a consensus among government of-
ficials and scholars in China that an explicit deposit insurance scheme has to
be established. This scheme should reach specific goals that will now be
outlined.
Protecting the interests of small depositors
Saving money with a financial institution has always been the preferred
method of financial investment in China. According to the Chinese State
Statistics Bureau, the savings rate in China has remained over 40 per cent of
personal disposable income in the past 30 years. The savings deposits
of Chinese urban and rural residents in 2001 were only RMB 7.3762 trillion
(approximately US $0.9 trillion). This amount increased to RMB 30.3303 trillion
(approximately US $4.5 trillion) in 2010. In other words, in 10 years,
the amount of savings has increased 4.11 times. The annual growth rate is
over 17 per cent, and the savings rate in 2010 reached as high as 46 per cent,
32 PBC, China Financial Stability Report 2011 (China Financial Publishing House 2011) 143,
5http://www.pbc.gov.cn/image_public/UserFiles/english/upload/File/China%20Financial%20
Stability%20Report%202011.pdf4accessed 8 May 2013.
33 JiabaoWen, Report on theWork of the Government (Fifth Session of the Eleventh National People’s
Congress, Beijing, 5 March 2012),5http://www.china.org.cn/learning_english/2012-03/14/con
tent_24894055_7.htm4accessed 8 May 2013.
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which is substantially higher than in most Western countries, even including
Japan, which is traditionally considered to be a country with a high savings
rate.34
There are several reasons for the high savings rates in China. First, given the
limited coverage by the social security system (social healthcare insurance,
pension insurance, and so on), increasing house prices, and increasing ex-
penses for the children’s education, the financial assets of China’s low-income
households are relatively limited. Thus, savings deposits for many Chinese con-
stitute the basic living guarantee for the future. Second, with the current
rapid economic development, the income of Chinese residents has also
increased. For example, from 1991 to 1999, China’s GDP increased 10.4 per cent
per annum on average, while the disposable income of urban residents and
the net income of rural residents increased 6.9 per cent and 4.8 per cent re-
spectively. Under the influence of these factors, residents’ income nationally
increased at an annual average rate of 7.1 per cent.35 Due to limited alternative
investment channels, a high number of resident assets still consists of deposits.
Therefore, one can notice that among all possible financial instruments, de-
posits still play the most important role for ordinary Chinese residents.
The structure of deposits in China is another very important element.
According to the 2011China PrivateWealth Report, China’s overall individual in-
vestable assets totalled RMB 62 trillion in 2010.36 This amount constituted a
19 per cent increase since 2009. By the end of 2010, there were 503,000
Chinese with a high net worth of at least RMB 10 million in investable assets.
Their average investable assets per capita were approximately RMB 30 million.
The aggregate investable assets for all high net worth individuals equalled
RMB 15 trillion and accounted for 24.2 per cent of the total investable assets.
By the end of 2010, the total population of China was 1.34 billion, which
means that only 0.37 per cent of the population accounted for 24.2 per cent of
all investable assets, while the other 99.63 per cent of small deposit accounts
are made up of the vast majority of household savings deposits in China.
Small deposits are also essential for satisfying the basic needs for the vast
majority of low-income depositors. These small depositors do not have suffi-
cient financial resources and investment skills. For them, it is difficult to
make a correct evaluation of the asset quality of banks. Therefore, it could be
considered unfair to let small depositors bear the losses of bank failures that
they are unable to evaluate. Protecting these small depositors via a deposit in-
surance scheme could therefore contribute to social stability. The deposit
34 All data come from Chinese State Statistics Bureau’s official website at:5http://www.stats.gov.
cn4accessed 8 May 2013.
35 Wen Li, ‘The Income and Consumption of Chinese Residents since Reform and Opening Up’
(2007),5http://www.iccs.cn/contents/471/9034.html4accessed 8 May 2013.
36 China Merchant Bank and Bain and Company, 2011 China Private Wealth ReportçChina’s
Private Banking Industry: Competition Is Getting Fierce’ (2011),5http://www.bain.com/Images/
2011_China_wealth_management_report.pdf4accessed 8 May 2013.
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insurance scheme could protect the interests of small depositors and improve
the living standard for many of these low income depositors.
Preventing a banking crisis
Since China became the 143rd member of theWorld Trade Organization (WTO)
at Doha on 10 November 2001, after five years of protecting its banking and
insurance sectors, China has the obligation, under the WTO rules, to move
towards a market economy and open up its financial market.37 A deposit insur-
ance scheme could effectively protect the financial system against a credit
crisis by avoiding the insolvency of banks and thus maintaining financial sta-
bility. Moreover, China has the obligation to reform its financial system towards
a market-oriented model of equal competition in the financial market. An im-
portant element of the reform of the banking system in China is to promote
fair competition and hence prevent monopolistic behaviour. In this respect,
there is a problem in China since, as was already mentioned earlier, an import-
ant characteristic of the top five banks is that they are all state controlled.
Since China does not have floating interest rates between commercial banks,
many depositors may believe that the top five state-controlled banks are more
trustworthy. Thus, depositors may have the tendency to deposit their savings
with these top five banks. Depositors may consider that the state-controlled
banks will enjoy an implicit guarantee from government in case of financial
difficulties. This preference of the market for state-controlled banks may be to
the disadvantage of newly established private commercial banks, urban and
rural credit cooperatives, and other non-state-owned banking institutions.
An explicit deposit insurance scheme may help to change this situation and
hence to guarantee fair competition between the top five state-controlled
banks and other financial institutions. This competition will of course benefit
consumers who will obtain lower costs and better services. By establishing a
legal framework for deposit insurance, regulatory authorities could at the
same time regulate the market exit of certain financial institutions, which
could improve the overall efficiency of the financial market. Today, the top five
state-controlled banks were all listed companies in the past eight yearsçfour
of them were even listed on the international stock market. Thus, they must
earn money for their shareholders, including their foreign shareholders. An
implicit deposit insurance scheme has the disadvantage that it uses ordinary
tax payers’ money to subsidize shareholders and depositors from commercial
banks. An explicit deposit insurance scheme, on the other hand, makes finan-
cial institutions pay an insurance premium as a result of which small- and
medium-sized financial institutions can compete more easily with the top five
in China. This competition could increase the efficiency of financial institu-
tions, but, at the same time, it could also increase financial risks and thus the
37 C Satapathy, ‘China’s Membership of WTO: A Few Impressions’ (2002) 37 Econ & Pol Weekly
2208.
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risk of possible bank runs. Again, an explicit deposit insurance scheme can
thus not only regulate financial institutions, but it could also warn banks in
case of poor management. At the same time, the deposit insurance scheme
could also prevent well-performing banks from suffering from a bank run in a
systemic banking crisis. Ideally, a deposit insurance scheme could benefit
well-managed banks and lead to the exit of poorly performing banks.
Establishing an effective market exit mechanism
The case of HDB, discussed earlier, showed that the government-based implicit
insurance scheme has a high cost when a commercial bank exits the market.
A deposit insurance scheme could provide a legal framework with an exit
mechanism for financial institutions, which could protect the interests of de-
positors and maintain the stability of the financial system. Currently, the cre-
ation of a financial institution is regulated by the PBC and other regulatory
bodies. However, in the case of the failure of a financial institution, there are
no adequate market exit mechanisms. De facto, local governments often play a
key role in maintaining social stability, which often amounts to a bailing out
by local government. In a well-functioning market economy, a (financial) enter-
prise should have the possibility of failing and exiting the marketçin this re-
spect, a bank should not constitute an exception. Thus, participating in a
deposit insurance scheme should not only provide a guarantee for the finan-
cial institution itself but also for the depositors.
A deposit insurance scheme could collect a significant amount of premiums
to rescue financial institutions in case of difficulty. An insurance fund could
be used in a rational and timely way to minimize the damage when a bank
fails. Experience in the USA and Europe has shown that a deposit insurance
agency is important not only to provide liquidity for a bank38 but also to moni-
tor the compliance of banks.39 More importantly, since the deposit insurance
agency itself is the largest creditor of a failed bank, it could enable financial in-
stitutions to exit the market in a smooth way. For example, in the case of
Indymac Bank in 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) determined
that within the institutional framework at that time Indymac was unlikely to
be able to meet its continuing depositors’ demands in the normal course of
business and was therefore in an unsafe and unsound condition, so the OTS
announced Indymac’s closure late on 11 July 2008 and transferred operations
to the FDIC. The FDIC’s proposal for foreclosure avoidance was a loss-sharing
38 The experience in Europe will be discussed later in this article in the fourth section.
39 Grossman showed that newly insured thrifts undertook less risk than their uninsured coun-
terparts, possibly because of screening by deposit insurance authorities. However, a moral
hazard emerged gradually as a result of which he concludes that effective regulation and
supervision remain important in maintaining financial stability. Richard S Grossman, ‘Deposit
Insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the Thrift Industry: Evidence from the 1930s’
(1992) 82 Am Econ Rev 800.
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insurance plan, under which the federal government could make good on half
of the loss suffered by a lender that modified a loan according to the Indymac
protocol but later saw the loan go into default and foreclosure.40
Reducing the cost of bank failure
After the Asian financial crisis of 1998, the Chinese government decided to
issue RMB 270 billion special treasury bonds to increase the capital ratio for
the top four state-owned banks. Since 1999, these top four banks have peeled
off a total of RMB 1.3939 trillion in bad assets. These assets comprise the total
costs resulting from the failure of the banks. In November 2005, the PBC pub-
lished the first China Financial Stability Report and held that ‘the state paid a
huge number of financial and human resources to resolve the financial risks
and maintain the financial system stability’.41 The report did not give the spe-
cific amount, but, according toWenpeng Lu’s calculation in 2003, the public fi-
nance invested into the reconstruction costs of the Chinese banking system
equal approximately RMB 1.489 trillion, accounting for 30.2 per cent of GDP
in 1999.42
Although the financial costs resulting from the reconstruction of the bank-
ing system may be debated, there is no doubt that the current implicit deposit
guarantee system leads to staggering costs. Given the important growth of
China’s banking industry, it can be predicted that in the absence of a deposit in-
surance scheme, the next financial crisis in China would really lead to huge re-
construction costs for the banking system. Hence, the argument goes that it
seems wiser to develop an explicit deposit insurance scheme now that may
mitigate the impact of a future financial crisis.
Maturing the financial legal system
Currently in China, there is neither general, nor specific, legislation dealing
with bank insolvency or corporate restructuring. In the case of insolvency
only, the bankruptcy procedure that follows the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (which entered into force on 1 June
2007) and the Civil Procedure Law of PRC (which was amended on 1 April
2008) could apply.43 Some other laws may play a role such as the Law of the
PRC on the People’s Bank of China, the Commercial Bank Law of the PRC, the
40 Phillip Swagel, ‘The Financial Crisis: An Inside View’ (2009) Brookings Papers Econ Activity 1.
41 China Financial Stability Report, 2005. See5http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/959/1958/
19583/19583_.html4accessed 23 May 2013.
42 Wenpeng Lu, ‘Research on Government Guarantees and Fiscal Cost of China’s Economic
Transition’ PhD thesis, Fudan University, Shanghai (2003).
43 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China (2007); Civil Procedure Law of
People’s Republic of China (2008).
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Banking Supervision Law of the PRC, and the Companies Law of the PRC.44 In
addition, the State Council and financial regulators issued a number of regula-
tions on bank insolvency, such as the Regulations on Closure of Financial
Institutions (State Council Decree No. 324, 2001). These laws and regulations
have provided for some general rules that apply in case of the bankruptcy of a
bank. However, they fail to provide an adequate protection of the interests of
depositors or an adequate exist mechanism for banks in financial distress.
Legislation concerning deposit insurance could improve China’s banking legis-
lation system, as a result of which China would be more in line with interna-
tional standards.
Since the insolvency of a bank has a few specific features that are different
from the bankruptcy of an ordinary commercial company, most developed
countries have developed specific rules dealing with the insolvency of financial
institutions. For example in the USA, bank failures are regulated by the 1933
Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1933 as well as by a procedural amendment
that took place in the 1971 Federal Deposit Insurance Act.45 The 1991 Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act allowed the FDIC to borrow
directly from the Treasury department and mandated that the FDIC resolve
failed banks using the least-costly method available.46 It also ordered the
FDIC to assess insurance premiums according to risk and created new capital
requirements.47
In China, there now is an urgent need to establish a specific law dealing
with the insolvency of banks. This law should replace the many scattered
laws now dealing with bank failures and will enable the government to develop
uniform standards applicable in case of a bankruptcy, enabling the liquidation
of a financial institution in case of bankruptcy in an orderly fashion. Not
only does China currently lack a decent bankruptcy law for banks, but its prop-
erty law is also (notwithstanding many recent changes) not sufficiently
developed. Since there are no rules on how the government could act, for ex-
ample, as a lender of last resort, rules are also failing in regard to the alloca-
tion of assets of non-performing banks. Again, lacking the financial support
from a deposit insurance scheme, the government will have to intervene and
use tax payers’ money. In sum, the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme
44 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China (1995); Commercial Bank
Law of the People’s Republic of China (1995); Banking Supervision Law of the People’s
Republic of China (2003); Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China (1994).
45 Insurance is provided through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which in-
sures deposits in banks for at least US $250,000. It was created in 1933 in response to the thou-
sands of bank failures that occurred in the 1920s and early 1930s. The FDIC claims on its
website (since the start of FDIC insurance on 1 January 1934) that no depositor has lost a
single cent of insured funds as a result of a failure. Federal Deposit Insurance Act Pub L
81-797, 64 Stat 873.
46 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 12 USC 1811.
47 On the importance of charging risk dependent premiums, seeWhite (n16). On the reform of de-
posit insurance in the USA, see John L Douglas, ‘Deposit Insurance Reform’ (1992) 27 Wake
Forest L Rev 11.
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in China would bring the financial legislation to maturity, protecting the con-
sumers’ rights, increasing the efficiency of the financial system, and bringing
it in line with international standards.
The deposit guarantee scheme in the EU
Goals of the directives
On 30 May 1994, Counsel Directive (EC) 94/19 on deposit guarantee schemes
was promulgated.48 The preamble to the Directive clearly states that the goal
of the Directive is to provide a harmonized minimum level of deposit protection
wherever deposits are located in the Community. Developing these rules was
important for the EU in order to complete the single banking market. The pre-
amble also holds that there are undoubtedly costs for a bank to participate in
a guarantee scheme, but these costs bear no relation to the costs that would
result from a massive withdrawal of bank deposits not only from a credit insti-
tution in difficulties, but also from healthy institutions following a loss of de-
positor confidence in the soundness of the banking system. The preamble
therefore clearly shows that the goal of Directive 94/19 was to provide a har-
monized system of deposit guarantee in order to avoid bank runs. After bank-
ruptcies of various financial institutions in the 1960s and 1970s, many
European countries had already established explicit deposit guarantee systems,
but the EU felt that it was important to have a more or less harmonized
system for the completion of the single banking market.
Interestingly, Directive 94/19 revealed, on the one hand, the necessity to pre-
scribe a minimum guarantee level (to have some degree of harmonization in
the (then) EU), but, on the other hand, the drafters also realized that complete
protection for all deposits could lead to a moral hazard on the side of financial
institutions. In the preamble of the Directive, this danger is formulated in the
following way:
Whereas, on the one hand, the minimum guarantee level prescribed in this
Directive should not leave too great a proportion of deposits without protection
in the interest both of consumer protection and of the stability of the financial
system; whereas, on the other hand, it would not be appropriate to impose
throughout the Community a level of protection which might in certain cases
have the effect of encouraging the unsound management of credit institutions;
whereas the cost of funding schemes should be taken into account; whereas
it would appear reasonable to set the harmonized minimum guarantee level
at ECU 20.000.
Therefore, Directive 94/19 introduced a mandatory deposit guarantee
scheme. Article 3 provided that no credit institution authorized in a Member
State would be allowed to take a deposit unless it was a member of such a
scheme. Article 10 of the Directive holds that deposit guarantee schemes shall
48 Directive 94/19 (n 2).
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be in a position to pay duly verified claims by depositors in respect of unavail-
able deposits within three months after the relevant competent authorities
have determined that the credit institution concerned appears to be unable to
repay the deposit and to have no current prospect of being able to do so.
Counsel Directive (EC) 2009/14 on deposit guarantee schemes as regards the
coverage and the payout delay has amended Directive 94/19.49 The goal of
this new Directive is to amend the previous Directive with respect to two im-
portant points, the coverage level and the payout delay. The most important
reason to issue a new Directive in 2009 was that after the financial crisis of
2008 it had become clear that the previous directive of 1994 provided min-
imum coverage levels that were too low and that had to be adapted. Another
important amendment in Directive 2009/14 was that it was held that the
payout delay of three months currently provided for in the (old) Directive 94/
19 runs counter to the need to maintain depositor confidence and does not
meet their needs. After all, Directive 94/19 had already installed a deposit
guarantee system, but it was apparently not able to sufficiently restore depos-
itor confidence and prevent bank runs. Therefore, the new directive stipulates
that the payout delay should be reduced to a period of 20 working days.
The minimum coverage level
In Article 7, Directive 94/19 provides a minimum coverage level of at least
E20,000. According to Article 13, Member States have to bring their laws into
conformity with the Directive by 1 July 1995. However, Article 7(1) provides
that in Member States in which, when this Directive was adopted, deposits are
not covered, up to E20,000 would apply as the maximum amount laid down
in their national guarantee schemes, provided that such amount was not less
than E15,000. This transitional period could be valid until 31 December 1999.
The limit applies to the aggregate deposits placed with the same credit institu-
tion, irrespective of the number of deposits. Hence, when a person makes vari-
ous deposits with Bank A, the maximum amount covered by the deposit
guarantee scheme (of E15,000 or E20,000) would apply. If, on the other hand,
the same person also has made deposits with banks B and C, a similar
amount would apply as well.
A study done by the European Commission on the minimum guarantee level
showed that there are considerable differences between the Member States.
Moreover, the study also held that by 2004 the average guarantee level had
decreased overtime in real terms, essentially due to the erosive effects of infla-
tion in those countries that had a guarantee level higher than the harmonized
minimum in 1995. The study therefore concluded that the original goal of the
Directive was not to ‘leave too great a proportion of deposits without protection
in the interest both of consumer protection and of the stability of the financial
49 Counsel Directive (EC) 2009/14 on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage and the
payout delay [2009] OJ L68/3.
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system’, such a goal could not be achieved any longer across all Member States
where there was great variation in the ratio between the insured and insurable
deposits. Moreover, in some Member States, so the study concluded, almost all
insurable deposits were de facto subject to deposit insurance as a result of
which the guarantee level could encourage unsound management of credit in-
stitutions, which the Directive precisely wanted to avoid. As a result, the
report proposed amending the original Directive 94/19.
The new Directive was obviously triggered by the financial crisis that started
in 2008. This crisis led to the already mentioned new Directive 2009/14,
which increased the protection for individuals to an amount of E50,000. The
preamble to Directive 2009/14 holds:
The current minimum coverage level provided for in Directive 94/19/EC is
set at Euro 20.000 with the option for Member States to determine higher
coverage. However, this has proved not to be adequate for a large number of de-
posits in the Community. In order to maintain depositor confidence and
attain greater stability on the financial markets, the minimum coverage level
should therefore be increased to Euro 50.000. By 31 December 2010, coverage
for the aggregate deposits of each depositor should be set at Euro 100.000,
unless a Commission impact assessment, submitted by the European
Parliament and the Council by 31 December 2009, concludes that such an in-
crease and such harmonization are inappropriate and are not financially
viable for all Member States in order to ensure consumer protection and finan-
cial stability in the Community and to avoid distortions of competition between
Member States.50
An example of how this scheme has been implemented in a Member State
can be provided by looking at the system in the Netherlands. Initially, the
Dutch deposit guarantee scheme guaranteed an amount of E20,000. In 2005,
this amount was increased to E40,000. Of this amount, E20,000 was guaran-
teed for 100 per cent, while depositors faced a risk of 10 per cent on the next
E20,000. As a consequence, depositors could only receive compensation for a
maximum of E38,000 if their deposits exceeded the amount of E40,000. This
kind of coverage is referred to as co-insurance. As a result of a legislative
change (following the financial crisis) in October 2008, the guaranteed
amount rose from E40,000 to E100,000 without any co-insurance.51 This
amount was in excess of the prescribed level of coverage that was set by the
European Commission for 2010 at E50,000, but it was in line with the years
to follow.52
50 Consideration (3) preceding Directive 2009/14 (n 49).
51 On 7 October 2008, the Dutch minister of finance announced the new guarantee limits. See
also the memorandum of the Dutch Ministry of Finance (Doc FM/2008-2610M) in which the
current deposit guarantee limits of the European Union (EU) are expressed.
52 Just to compare: the amounts in the USA are substantially larger. Savings, checking, and other
deposit accounts are generally insured to US $250,000 per depositor in each bank or thrift
the FDIC insures. This amount of US $250,000 per depositor applies until 31 December 2013.
On 1 January 2014, the standard insurance amount will return to US $100,000 per depositor
(see the website of the FDIC5http://www.fdic.gov/4accessed 8 May 2013).
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Financing
An important question is obviously how the deposit guarantee scheme, which
was created in Europe, is financed. Strikingly, the original Directive 94/14
was silent on the point of financing. The new Directive 2009/14 states:
A report to be submitted to the European Parliament and to the Council by
the Commission should analyse all related issues such as set-offs and counter
claims, the determination of contributions to schemes, the scope of product
and depositors covered, the effectiveness of cross-border cooperation between
deposit-guarantee schemes and the link between deposit guarantee schemes
and alternative means for reimbursing depositors, such as emergency payout
mechanisms. For the purpose of that report, Member States should collect the
relevant data and submit them to the Commission on request.53
Interestingly, Article 7 of Directive 2009/14 explicitly provides in the
replaced Article 12(1)(c) that the Commission shall submit a report by 31
December 2009 and that it shall also examine ‘possible models for introducing
risk-based contributions’. Meanwhile, important steps have been set up in that
respect. A report was filed by the Econometrics and Applied Statistics Unit at
the Joint Research Centre concerning possible models for risk-based contribu-
tions to EU deposit guarantee schemes.54 This report led to a legislative pro-
posal for a thorough revision of Directive 94/19.55 The proposal holds in a
newArticle 11 that risk-based contributions will be introduced in deposit guar-
antee schemes, such that a differentiation can take place between the levels of
contribution paid by the least and most risky banks from 75 per cent to 200
per cent of the standard amount, respectively.56 This contribution would be
incorporated in a newly drafted Article 11, which holds that the determination
of the degree of risk incurred and the calculation of contributions would be
based on specific elements referred to in Annexes I and II. These annexes pro-
vide some core indicators related, inter alia, to the asset quality, capital ad-
equacy, profitability, and liquidity of the particular financial institution.57
In general, a deposit guarantee system can be funded in three ways, namely
ex ante and ex post as well as a combination of ex ante and ex post mechan-
isms.58 Ex ante funding requires the accumulation and maintenance of a fund
to cover deposit insurance claims and related expenses prior to a failure actu-
ally occurring. It is funded by its members through contributions, insurance
premiums, and other means.59 Ex post funding occurs after the bankruptcy of
53 Consideration (5) preceding Directive 2009/14 (n 49).
54 European Commission, Joint Research Centre (n 3).




58 International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), Funding of Deposit Insurance Systems,
Guidance Paper from the Research and Guidance Committee (2009), 5http://www.iadi.org/
docs/Funding%20Final%20Guidance%20Paper%206_May_2009.pdf4accessed 8 May 2013.
59 IADI (n 49) 6.








aastricht user on 06 Septem
ber 2021
a financial institution. The costs for the claims arising from the deposit guar-
antee system are born by the surviving financial institutions. Research by the
European Commission in 2007 shows that 16 Member States are using an ex
ante funding system, while six Member States have adopted an ex post
scheme. Five deposit guarantee systems do not meet the requirements to be
classified either as ex ante or as ex post. These schemes can be categorized
under a mixed system.60
Economic analysis
We will now have a look at the deposit insurance system from an economic per-
spective, taking into account the literature that was reviewed in the second sec-
tion of this article. The economic analysis will generally address economic
effects of explicit deposit guarantee systems and address the way in which the
system has been conceived in the EU. Since China does not have an explicit de-
posit insurance scheme yet, there is little to say on the Chinese system today.
The analysis will instead be used to see to what extent China could learn from
the way in which Europe has implemented the deposit guarantee scheme.
As we already indicated in the introduction and in the second section, de-
posit guarantee schemes to some extent pose a kind of paradox. Despite the
fact that a deposit guarantee system can contribute to financial stability by
making depositor runs less likely,61 it can also, ex ante, create adverse incentives
for the parties involved. In general, the existence of a deposit guarantee
system will lead to moral hazards as the various stakeholders are sheltered
from the negative consequences of their behaviour.62 Clearly, the more com-
plete the deposit guarantee system, the more likely it is that moral hazards
will occur.63 We will now analyse more specifically how such a deposit guaran-
tee system could potentially affect the incentives of the various actors.
Incentives of financial institutions
The existence of a deposit guarantee system can give financial institutions an
incentive to pursue more risky investments.64 This behaviour is called a moral
60 European Commission, Report on the minimum guarantee level of Deposit Guarantee Schemes
Directive 94/19/EC, 2007, 19 (5ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/report_en.
pdf4accessed 27 June 2013). See also European Commission, Joint Research Centre (n 3).
61 Despite the existence of deposit guarantee systems, the current financial crisis shows us that
depositors panick and withdraw their money from financial institutions that are in trouble.
This behaviour could be seen at Northern Rock in the United Kingdom and Fortis and Dirk
Scheringa Beheer in the Netherlands.
62 See generally on this issue, Steven Shavell, ‘On Moral Hazard and Insurance’ (1979) Q J Econ 541.
63 See, eg, Schich (n 21).
64 Charles AE Goodhart, ‘The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis’ (2009) 46 Centre for
Economic Studies IFO Working Paper Series no 2257,5http://ssrn.com/abstract¼11130024ac-
cessed 8 May 2013.
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hazard. Moral hazards in banking arise when banks are provided with incen-
tives to take risks, retain the returns, but, at the same time, pass the (potential
or realized) costs of the risk to the depositors, regulators, or taxpayers.65 In
addition, risky financial institutions will often pay higher interest rates to at-
tract funding.We have witnessed this possibility in the case of Icesave, which
offered an interest rate of 5.25 per cent compared with an interest rate of 3.4
per cent offered by Rabobank Nederland at the same time.66 So it is likely that
a deposit guarantee system encourages (excessive) risk taking by insured insti-
tutions, leading to a negative impact on their solvency.67 However, the way a
deposit guarantee system is funded may, to some extent, counterbalance these
adverse incentives. Ex ante funding with the use of risk-based premiums can
give the participating financial institutions incentives to lower the risk of
their operations in order to lower the premiums they have to pay for the de-
posit guarantee fund. Given the fact that financial institutions are profit-maxi-
mizing institutions, they will try to lower their premiums as much as possible
in order to maximize their profits. In this way, a risk-based premium will give
financial institutions incentives to behave in a less risky way.68 Until now,
only eight European countries have applied a risk-based contribution to their
deposit guarantee fund. The differences have ranged from a minimum contri-
bution of 75 per cent to a maximum contribution of 140 per cent of the stand-
ard amount.69 One might question whether these differences will give the
financial institutions sufficient incentives to lower the risk of their operations.
Looking at the funding of the Dutch deposit guarantee fund, one can notice
(i) that the contribution by financial institutions is ex post and (ii) that it de-
pends on the size of their business and not on their risk exposure.70
Therefore, it is unlikely that the current deposit insurance system in the
Netherlands gives sufficient incentives to the financial institutions for keeping
their risk level at an average level.71 This means that there has to be a strong
supervisory system to encounter the potentially adverse effects of the existing
deposit guarantee fund.
65 See AW Mullineux andV Murinde, Handbook of International Banking (Edward Elgar 2003) 640;
Groeneveld (n 4) 422.
66 Icesave offered this interest rate in July 2008. See Spaarbaak Euro,5http://www.spaarbaak.nl/
Hoge_rente_bij_nieuwe_Icesave_spaarrekening.txt4accessed 8 May 2013.
67 Santomero (n 18).
68 On the incentives effects of risk differentiation generally, see KJ Crocker and A Snow, ‘The
Theory of Risk Classification’ in G Dionne (ed), Handbook of Insurance (Springer 2000) 245. See
also Groeneveld (n 4) 422.
69 European Commission (n 60) 2.
70 See Article 12 of the Besluit bijzondere prudentie« le maatregelen, beleggerscompensatie en
depositogarantie Wft (regulation on preventive measures, compensation for investors and
deposit guarantee).
71 There is, moreover, strong empirical evidence showing that the overall effect of a deposit guar-
antee system is that it induces financial institutions towards excessive risk taking. Hence, it
leads to financial instability rather than prevent it. Kam Hon Chu, ‘Deposit Insurance and
Banking Crisis in the Short and Long Run’ (2003) 23 Cato Journal 265.
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Incentives of potential depositors
The next question is how a deposit guarantee system affects the incentives of
potential clients wishing to bring their savings to a financial institutionçin
short, the depositors. A deposit guarantee system reduces the incentives for de-
positors to monitor the risks of the financial institutions they are willing to
do business with. The reason is that if depositors know ex ante that they are
being fully compensated when a financial institution goes bankrupt, it is obvi-
ous that they have no incentive at all to look critically at the financial institu-
tions they are willing to do business with. It is likely that they care little
about the assets their institutions hold or their likelihood of failure as their
claim is on the government, not against the financial institution itself.72 The
power of this adverse incentive depends on (i) the level and (ii) the structure
of the deposit coverage. Within Europe, the level of deposit coverage varies
among the member countries, with a minimum level of E50,000 being stated
in the directive of the European Commission. Calculations of the European
Commission show that 80 per cent of the savings is already covered at this
level.73
Besides the level of deposit insurance, the structure of the coverage impacts
the incentives for depositors. Some countries implement a certain excess in
their deposit coverage. For example, the first layer of, for example, E20,000 is
guaranteed in full, the next layer (of, for example, E80,000) is guaranteed
only to a certain proportion of, say 50 per cent. In this way, depositors still
face a certain financial risk. This risk should encourage them to monitor the
financial institutions they are doing business with more adequately. This mech-
anism is called co-insurance. However, as already mentioned, the European
Commission has abandoned the use of co-insurance in their new Directive
2009/14.
It is important to notice that the earlier-described group of depositors is
not the only category of stakeholders in a financial institution. Uninsured de-
positors, like other creditors, shareholders, and managers, are still exposed to
the increased risk exposure of the financial institution. This exposure should
encourage them to monitor and limit the riskiness of the bank.74 A question
one might ask is which party is in the best position to monitor financial insti-
tutions. There is, however, a problem in the sense that empirical evidence
shows that there is little consumer awareness about deposit insurance.75 If
there was indeed limited awareness of the deposit insurance scheme, the
moral hazard that could follow from such a scheme would probably not be
overestimated.
72 Santomero (n 18) 16.
73 Groeneveld (n 4) 421.
74 Ibid 420.
75 Michiel Bijlsma and Karen van der Wiel, ‘Consumer Perception of Deposit Insurance: Limited
Awareness, Limited Effectiveness?’ (2012) TILEC Discussion Paper no 2012-013,5http://ssrn.
com/abstract¼20341864accessed 8 May 2013.
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This recognition shows again exactly the paradox with a deposit guarantee
system. A fully coveraging system may dilute incentives for the proper
risk management of financial institutions and encourage, in the words of
Directive 94/19 ‘unsound management of credit institutions’. Some incentives
should therefore still be provided to potential depositors to monitor the finan-
cial institution, of course, assuming that depositors are able to exercise such a
monitoring function. In this case, an argument could be made in favour of a
so-called co-insurance, meaning that the insurance scheme does not provide
full coverage. Another (perhaps more appropriate) alternative would be to
introduce risk-based contributions. In the latter case, the manager of the de-
posit guarantee system would monitor the management of the financial insti-
tutions and adapt the contributions to the fund accordingly.
Implicit deposit guarantee system
Let us, finally, also briefly address the implicit guarantee system since that is in
fact the system that currently exists in China. The question arises as to what
the effects may be of this nationalization on the incentives for the parties
involved.76 For the financial institutions, it means that it might encourage reck-
lessness since the government would intervene (for example, by bailing out
the company) in the event that it was about to go out of business. It raises the
issue of a moral hazard in business operations.When depositors know ex ante
that the government is going to bail out large financial institutions whenever
they get into trouble, they have little incentive to monitor these institutions
themselves due to the fact that they will not face any damage at all in the
case of a bail out by the government.77 This outcome shows once more
the point we also made when discussing the current situation in China in the
third section of this article, being that bailing out by government provides
worse incentives than a deposit insurance scheme.
Towards a deposit guarantee scheme in China
The third section of this article showed that China is well on its way to
developing a deposit insurance scheme. The fourth section showed the evolu-
tion of such a scheme in Europe as well as the problems that it has encoun-
tered. The question now arises whether particular lessons can be drawn from
the experience in Europe and the economic analysis, given the particular
needs of the financial markets in China.
76 On this issue, see also KS Okamoto, ‘After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard’
(2009) 57 UCLA L Rev 183, who argues that the financial crisis was caused by what he refers
to as ‘systemic moral hazard’.
77 T Beck and others, ‘Bailing out the Banks: Reconciling Stability and Competition: An Analysis
of State-Supported Schemes for Financial Institutions’ (2010) 37 Centre for Econ Policy
Research,5http://www.cepr.org/pubs/other/bailing_out_the_banks.htm4accessed 6 June 2013.








aastricht user on 06 Septem
ber 2021
Developing a legal and institutional framework
To some extent, the failure of a financial institution, certainly when it is related
to a financial crisis could be compared to a natural disaster.78 In some cases
(more particularly when a financial crisis is systemic), the probability of its oc-
currence is difficult to predict and the magnitude of the damage may be
huge.79 Moreover, many other entities beyond the single financial institution
involved could be affected as well. In this respect, one could argue that regulat-
ing deposit insurance as a tool to prevent such financial collapse is a public
good. Providing and regulating public goods is from an economic perspective
the task of government and within the legal framework of the central govern-
ment. The legislative framework should, as was the case in the EU, focus on
the scope of the insured deposits, the insurance method, the deposit insurance
agencies, and the legal responsibility of all stakeholders involved. Within the
current proposals in China, the State Council will decide the legislative frame-
work instead of the National People’s Congress, but according to section 8 of
the Legislation Law of the PRC legislating the basic system of social and
public policy must be the task of the National People’s Congress or its
Standing Committee. This would make regulating a legislative framework,
which is necessary for a deposit insurance scheme, the task of the National
People’s Congress.
In addition to choosing an appropriate level to regulate the deposit insurance
scheme, it is also important to guarantee the independence of a deposit insur-
ance agency that would be created. Based on the experience in the USA and
in Europe, it is of the utmost importance to guarantee that the deposit insur-
ance agency can monitor financial institutions independently and develop the
most suitable deposit insurance policies.80 Especially within the context of
China’s financial market, the independence of this agency from other govern-
mental institutions (and, more particularly, from the Ministry of Finance)
would be important. Of course, an exchange of information and good cooper-
ation between the deposit insurance agency, on the one hand, and the Central
Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and the banking regulatory authorities, on the
other hand, is of the utmost importance. However, precisely given the large
state involvement in the banking sector81 independence of the agency seems
of the utmost importance to guarantee the effectiveness of its operations.
78 On the problems with the insurability of natural disasters, see Christophe Courbage andWalter
Stahel, ‘Insurance and Extreme Events’ in Christophe Courbage and Walter Stahel (eds)
Extreme Events and Insurance: 2011Annus Horribilis (Geneva Association 2012) 17^26.
79 On the relationship between financial crisis and insurance, see Michael Faure and Klaus Heine,
‘Insurance against Financial Crisis?’ (2011) NYU J L & Business 117.
80 The experience in the USA has also shown that in less strict regulatory regimes and with little
supervision by deposit insurance authorities moral hazard (leading to higher risk taking) will
pose a serious problem. Grossman (n 39). In this respect, see also White (n 16) who fears that
deposit insurance will create insurmountable incentive problems and may therefore be in-
appropriate for developing or transition economies.
81 Remember that we mentioned that the five largest banks in China are all state controlled.
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The scope of the deposit insurance scheme
The next question to be regulated in the legislative framework is to which fi-
nancial institutions the deposit insurance scheme will apply. In this respect, it
should be remembered that the situation of the financial market in China is
quite a peculiar one, given the role of the top five state-owned commercial
banks. Given the state’s intervention, they do have a good reputation in the fi-
nancial market, and, for them, there may not be a need to engage in a deposit
insurance scheme, given the fact that they hardly run an insolvency risk. If
the deposit insurance scheme was therefore to be voluntary, these top five
banks would not be inclined to join the scheme. Given the large volume of
their deposits, they would have to pay relatively higher premiums than others.
The reluctance of these five big players is probably the most important reason
why a mandatory deposit insurance scheme has not yet been introduced in
China.82
The recent history in China has shown that most of the failed financial insti-
tutions have been relatively small- or medium-sized local commercial banks
or credit cooperatives. Examples include HDB, ZXUCC, and so on.83 For them,
the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme is obviously quite important
to guarantee depositors’ confidence. They would be inclined to join such a
scheme (which could also provide protection to the banks), but, given their
smaller share in the banking deposit market, the share of premiums they
would pay into the insurance fund would be smaller as well.
In order to avoid an unsolvable adverse selection problem (basically meaning
that only bad risks would join the scheme), the deposit insurance scheme
would have to be universal and mandatory. The scheme should therefore
cover the top five state-owned commercial banks, joint-venture commercial
banks, city commercial banks, urban credit cooperatives, rural commercial
banks, urban and rural cooperative banks, postal savings, and all deposit-
taking financial institutions.
Coverage level
The European example has shown that there are a few deficiencies in the
European deposit guarantee system, at least as far as providing incentives to
the parties involved is concerned. Given the relatively high amount of coverage,
there may be negative incentives on the side of the financial institutions,
82 Note that in this respect the situation in China is notably different than at the enactment of fed-
eral deposit insurance in the USA. Kane and Wilson show that whereas conventional wisdom
held that insurance helped small rural banks at the expense of large urban institutions, data
in fact show that the insurance did help stockholders of large banks (more particularly by
restoring depositor confidence). Edward J Kane and Barry K Wilson, ‘A Contracting-Theory
Interpretation of the Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance’ (1998) National Bureau of
Economic ResearchWorking Paper no 6451,5http://www.nber.org/papers/w64514accessed 8
May 2013. Through state ownership, the situation of large banks in China is notably different.
83 For a discussion of those examples, see Kane andWilson (n 85) volume 3A, 1^2.
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which have been particularly feared by the European Commission. In this
sense, a deposit guarantee system could encourage risky behaviour by the
managers of financial institutions. In addition, the incentives for depositors of
monitoring the managers of financial institutions would be lacking when the
amount of coverage is too high. One obvious remedy is lowering the amount
of coverage of the deposit guarantee system. Thus, depositors would still face
more risk and, hence, have more incentive to monitor the financial institutions
they are doing business with.
Furthermore, a lower coverage level would also have a positive effect on the
incentives of financial institutions. It is likely that a lower coverage level
would result in less moral hazard and therefore in less risky activities by finan-
cial institutions. Lowering the coverage level would also imply shifting the bal-
ance from the deposit guarantee system to the use of tort law. The chance
that a depositor is not fully compensated by the deposit guarantee system in-
creases when the coverage level decreases. Therefore, it is likely that depositors
would use tort law more often (by holding the financial regulators or govern-
ment liable) in order to get compensation. As a result, both the government
and financial regulators would face a greater risk of being held liable and, as
a result, would have more incentive to keep a close watch on the behaviour of
financial institutions. Thus, lowering the coverage level of the deposit guaran-
tee fund would obviously be the best solution for improving the incentives for
all parties involved. Of course, one has to be careful with this remedy, particu-
larly in the context of China. If the coverage level is so low that many deposits
would not be covered anymore under the insurance scheme, the system
would totally lose its effectiveness.
Another method, also discussed and proposed in the literature in Europe,84
is to introduce co-insurance (sometimes also referred to as a deductible). This
method would mean that a lower threshold would have to be passed, for ex-
ample, and depositors would hence still carry part of the risk themselves.
Again, both remedies (lowering the coverage level and introducing co-insur-
ance) might be proposed in the EU context (where depositors may not need sav-
ings to satisfy their basic needs), but they may be risky in the context of
China. If, after all, the deposit insurance scheme would provide amounts of
coverage that are too low, the risk of bank runs (which is the main motivation
to start the deposit insurance scheme in the first place) could not be elimi-
nated. Hence, the question arises whether, notwithstanding the deposit insur-
ance scheme, appropriate incentives to managers could not be provided via
other techniques.
Financing
In most countries, the contribution due by the financial institution to the in-
surance fund is simply linked to the number of deposits. Hence, this quantity
84 See, eg, Dijkstra and Faure (n 5) 156^73.
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has amounted to applying a single uniform rate to the contributions.With the
development of financial innovation activities, high-risk banking business has
increased, and, as a result, a single uniform rate deposit insurance scheme
could not meet the reality of banking development. Thus, multiple rates for dif-
ferent bank-risk levels are more suitable for the current situation. Charging a
risk-based contribution has therefore become possible with the new tools of fi-
nancial risk management. Charging risk-based contributions would obviously
provide better incentives to financial institutions and could therefore remedy
the risk that the deposit insurance scheme would provide for unsound man-
agement. There may be arguments for such a risk-based contribution scheme
in China as well. For example, it could be held that the insolvency risk posed
by the top five banks is probably considerably lower, given their reinforcement
by the government. Moreover, charging a lower deposit insurance rate might
attract them to join a newly established deposit insurance scheme.
Both single and multiple rate systems are based on the actuarial calculation
of deposit insurance premiums, the insolvency probability of commercial
banks, and deposit insurance funds’ interests. However, whereas in the EU
and the USA financial risk management has developed to such an extent that
charging risk-based premiums is possible,85 the risk assessment system in
China’s financial institutions does not seem to have matured to such a level
that it would be possible to develop a detailed system of risk-based contribu-
tions. In addition, the deposit insurance agency is still to be installed, and its
staff has to accumulate enough experience to be able to charge differentiated
contributions. Initially, the main goal for the newly established deposit insur-
ance scheme would be to change from the implicit (government provided) to
the explicit deposit insurance scheme. The first priority may therefore be to de-
velop an appropriate organizational and institutional framework.
One could therefore hold that in an initial phase it may be more appropriate
(notwithstanding the economic advantages of a risk-based contribution
system) to start the Chinese deposit insurance scheme with unified or fixed
fees. In this respect, one should also remember that creating risk-based contri-
butions may create specific problems in China. For example, it would inevitably
lead to lower rates for the top five banks with their excellent reputation and
to higher rates for local commercial banks. The result would be that the
public may suspect that higher insurance rates would reflect higher risks as a
result of which depositors could transfer money from the higher rate (local)
banks to the low-risk (state-owned) banks, which would obviously be an un-
wanted result. Hence, one could consider the financing system in China
in the light of the fact that the privatization and decentralization of the
commercial banking system in China has not yet been completed. Charging
85 Interestingly, the USA learned from the failure of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (which was in crisis in early 1989) that risk dependent premiums had to be
charged. Before this time, federal insurers largely charged uniform premiums that ignored
risk, thereby insufficiently controlling for moral hazard. Lawrence J White, ‘The Reform of
Federal Deposit Insurance’ (1989) 3 J Econ Perspectives 11.
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risk-based contributions in an initial stage may thus lead to the undesirable
result of supporting the state-owned enterprises to the disadvantage of the
other players. Therefore, we argue that, differently than in the EU, it may be
more appropriate in China to start a system with unified contributions. Such
a system would benefit small- and medium-sized commercial banks, which
could compete more appropriately with the larger state-owned banks. When
deregulation and privatization in the banking sector in China has reached a
later stage, introducing risk-based premiums could be considered.
The timing
A legislative act may be symbolic for the explicit establishment of a deposit in-
surance scheme. Based on international experience, there is now a fairly large
consensus in China concerning the benefits of the introduction of such a
scheme. Discussions, however, still need to take place on the optimal timing.
The US deposit insurance scheme was established after the Great
Depression,86 but many other countries (such as Canada) established a deposit
insurance scheme during a peaceful period. The question of the optimal
timing for the introduction of the deposit insurance scheme in China has led
to heated discussions, especially after the financial crisis. There are two differ-
ent points of view among scholars on the timing issue. Wei Jianing, vice-dir-
ector of the Macroeconomic Research Department in the State Council
Development Research Center, argues that China should speed up the estab-
lishment of a deposit insurance scheme to prevent possible bank runs in the
future.87 While Wang Guogang, president of the Institute of Finance and
Banking in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has argued that since
there is a lack of a supporting system of interest marketization, increasing de-
posit insurance rates, and no independent insurance supervision body, a
hasty introduction of a deposit insurance scheme may actually be harmful to
China’s financial stability and security.88
We have argued that the introduction of a deposit insurance scheme is an
important element in a sound financial infrastructure. We have also argued
that given the stable macro-economic conditions in China, the timing for the
introduction of such a scheme in China has matured. Hence, there seem to be
very few reasons to further delay the introduction of such a scheme in China.
86 For the history of the deposit insurance legislation of 1933 in the USA, see Carter H Golembe,
‘The Deposit Insurance Legislation of 1933: An Examination of Its Antecedents and Its
Purposes’ (1960) 75 Pol Science Q 181;White (n 16). See also Charles W Calomiris and Eugene
M White, ‘The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance’ in Claudio Golden and Gary D Libecap
(eds), The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy (University of Chicago
Press 1994) 145^88.
87 JianingWei and Jiaolong Jiang, ‘Speeding up the Establishment of a Deposit Insurance Scheme
in China’ (2009) 16 China Finance 46 [in Chinese].
88 GuogangWang,‘Introduction of a Deposit Insurance System Should Not BeToo Hasty’ (2007) 7
Studies Int’l Finance 59 [in Chinese].
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Concluding remarks
This article began by arguing that China has experienced quite a few cases of
bank runs and subsequent bank failures. Some new commercial financial in-
stitutions have emerged and, in fact, have already collapsed a few years later.
To a large extent, these incidents are now covered through an implicit insur-
ance system that basically consists of the government bailing out financial in-
stitutions. Given the (still) important role that the government (both the
central state as well as local authorities) plays in China’s financial system, it
provides implicit insurance when financial institutions in which it has a stake
collapse. However, this article has also shown with examples that this system
is becoming increasingly costly. Moreover, many banks in China are no longer
state owned or are only owned by local authorities, and some commercial
banks are entering the financial market as well. However, the fact that they
may not rely on such an implicit insurance system may create unequal condi-
tions of competition since the implicit insurance system (provided by the
public authorities) could be considered to be state aid. Now that China has,
with the Anti-Monopoly Law of the PRC, introduced the importance of compe-
tition within its market system, it seems important that, as far as financial
institutions are concerned, this distortive effect should be remedied.89 An ex-
plicit deposit insurance scheme, so we have argued earlier, may provide such
a remedy.
Experiences in the USA and in Europe have shown that a deposit insurance
scheme can indeed provide this protection to depositors and may therefore
contribute to the prevention of bank runs.90 China has seen various attempts
to introduce an explicit deposit insurance scheme as well, but the system is
currently on hold as a result of the financial crisis. It is feared that the intro-
duction of such a scheme in these times of financial turmoil will lead to finan-
cial instability.We argue that it is nevertheless important to introduce such a
scheme in China, precisely to provide financial stability. However, we equally
argue that the institutional design needs to take into account the particular
features of the financial market in China as a result of which solutions that
may have worked in the USA or in Europe cannot simply be copy and pasted
to China. For example, the fact that the big five state-owned banks still play
such an important role in China’s financial system may be quite important in
the institutional design. In addition, from an economic perspective (and based
on experience in Europe), one would normally advise a differentiation whereby
risk dependent contributions are charged.
89 Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (30 August 2007). For an evaluation of the
anti-monopoly law in China, see the contributions in Faure and Zhang (n 1).
90 Although the 2008 financial crisis showed that the system may not have been perfect. After
all, Europe already had a deposit insurance scheme that could apparently not prevent bank
runs in particular cases, which was the reason to increase the amount of coverage in the new
directive of 2009 (see the discussion earlier in this article).








aastricht user on 06 Septem
ber 2021
However, this scheme may be a dangerous route to go in China. Such a risk
differentiation would probably lead to higher contributions for smaller com-
mercial banks than for the big five banks, which can all count on an implicit
guarantee by the state. Such risk differentiation could provide a wrong signal
to the market that the smaller commercial banks that are entering the market
may be less reliable than the state banks, which would jeopardize the privatiza-
tion of the banking system in China. This potential outcome may be an argu-
ment in favour of introducing a flat rate premium, at least when the deposit
insurance scheme is introduced. Obviously, it will require some political good-
will on the side of the big five state banks, which will then (at least in this
first phase) cross-subsidize to some extent the smaller commercial banks.
Another issue that needs to be carefully designed is the precise definition of
the optimal amount of the deposit insurance scheme. Experiences from the
USA and Europe have taught that this amount needs to be carefully
balancedçnot too high, on the one hand (thus stimulating a moral hazard on
the side of the depositors) and, on the other hand, not too low (in order to pre-
vent bank runs).
Of course, these and other institutional design issues need to be carefully ad-
dressed when introducing a deposit insurance scheme in China. In the
newest attempt to introduce interest marketization to attract deposits, which
began on 8 June 2012, even the top five banks raised their interest rate higher
than the standard 7.7 per cent, while the other smaller banks raised their rate
to a ceiling of 10 per cent.91 With this interest marketization, there must be a
market-wise deposit insurance scheme as the mating system. This kind of phe-
nomenon indicates that there are important points that can undoubtedly be
further addressed in our future research.
91 Rongping Hu, ‘Who Will Be the Winner of Interest Marketization?’ (2012) Economic Observer
5http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/hgds/20120615/235412327827.shtml4 accessed 8 May
2013 [in Chinese].
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